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LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
The Louisiana courts have never been presented with the
issue of the liability of one joint checking account signatory
for an overdraft drawn by another. The reasons for this may
be that cosignatories pay overdrafts created by another with-
out questioning their liability, law practitioners are unaware
that a cosignatory's liability may well be limited, and banks,
especially those in smaller communities, are aware that ad-
verse public relations may result from pursuing a cosignatory
beyond the account balance for an overdraft for which he was
not responsible or from which he did not benefit. Many prob-
lems can be avoided if checking account agreements are prop-
erly drafted and the banks call to the attention of their de-
positors the agreements' provisions. 40 To achieve the desired
uniformity, Louisiana courts should construe Title 10 to limit
the liability of each cosignatory to the balance of the account
in the absence of a valid indemnification agreement between
the bank and its joint account depositors, 41 or a showing of
the cosignatory's participation in the negotiation of the
check, enrichment through the creation of the overdraft, or
negligence or fraud inducing the bank to create the over-
draft.42
Malcolm S. Murchison
A PRIVATE CAUSE OF ACTION FOR VIOLATIONS OF
AIR POLLUTION LEGISLATION?-REMEDIES UNDER LOUISIANA
CIVIL CODE ARTICLES 667-669
During recent years, federal and state lawmakers have
enacted legislation aimed at protecting the purity of the at-
mosphere. The major federal legislation dealing with the con-
trol of air pollution is the Clean Air Act,' which was restruc-
tured and significantly strengthened in 1970.2 Louisiana took
action in this area in 1964, when the Louisiana Air Control
Law was enacted. 3 Both laws establish administrative agen-
40. See discussion in note 32, supra.
41. See text at notes 25-33, supra.
42. See text at notes 14-21, supra.
1. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1857-1857(1) (1970).
2. Pub. L. No. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1676 (1970). Most of what is now the Clean
Air Act came from these 1970 amendments.
3. LA. R.S. 40:2201-16 (Supp. 1964).
1090 [Vol. 36
cies whose duty is to prevent air contaminants from reaching
harmful levels. This note will examine the effects of these
laws and the respective agencies' regulations and findings on
the private rights of residents of Louisiana injured by pro-
hibited air pollution. 4
The Clean Air Act requires the Administrator of the En-
vironmental Protection Agency to set up a regulatory pro-
gram for all areas of the United States to control air pollutants
that, in his judgment, have an adverse effect on public health
and welfare. 5 These pollutants are controlled by the estab-
lishment of certain standards of air quality, called ambient
air standards, which set the maximum amount of pollutant
that will be allowed in the ambient air.6 For each pollutant,
the Administrator formulates both primary and secondary
ambient air standards. 7 The primary standard is that level of
ambient air quality that, in the judgment of the Adminis-
trator, is "requisite to protect the public health."" The strict-
er secondary standard is that level of ambient air quality
necessary to protect "public welfare." For more dangerous
4. The following discussion of the Clean Air Act will cover only those
portions of the Act relative to this note. For a more complete and exhaustive
analysis of the Act, see Environmental Law Institute, Federal Environmen-
tal Law 1058 (1974).
5. Clean Air Act §§ 108-12, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1857c-3 to 1857c-7 (1970). The
program includes control over both stationary and mobile emission sources,
but only the controls over stationary sources need be discussed for purposes
of this paper.
6. See text at note 11, infra. Ambient air is the outdoor air or atmosphere
which surrounds the earth. Louisiana Air Pollution Control Regulations § 4.6,
B.N.A. ENVIRONMENT REPORTER 391:0501.
7. The primary and secondary ambient air quality standards promul-
gated by the Administrator can be found at 40 C.F.R. § 50 (1975), and include
controls over the following pollutants: sulfur dioxide, particulates, carbon
monoxide, photochemical oxidants, hydrocarbons, and nitrogen dioxide. The
program calls for achievement of primary ambient air standards by 1975-76,
and secondary standards by a "reasonable time." Clean Air Act § 110(a)(2)(A),
42 U.S.C. § 1857c-5(aX2)(A) (1970); Environmental Law Institute, Federal En-
vironmental Law 1058, 1085 (1974).
8. Clean Air Act § 109(b)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-4(b)(1) (1970). The Act does
not define "public health."
9. Id. § 109(b)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-4(b)(2) (1970). "Public welfare" is
defined in the Act as "effects on soils, waters, crops, vegetation, man-made
materials, animal wildlife, weather, visibility and climate, damage to or de-
terioration of property and hazards to transportation, as well as effects on
economic values and on personal comfort and well being." Id. § 302(h), 42
U.S.C. § 1857h(h) (1970).
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air pollutants, hazardous pollutant emission limitations are
formulated.1 0 Whereas ambient standards create indirect
limitations on a particular source by stating a general stan-
dard of air quality that must be maintained in a certain
geographic area, emission limitations are direct controls on
the amount of a pollutant a particular source may emit.'1
The federal Clean Air Act required each state to adopt
and submit to the Administrator a plan that would provide
for the implementation, maintenance, and enforcement of the
primary and secondary ambient air standards within the
state.' 2 The Louisiana Air Control Commission, created by
the Air Control Law, 13 developed and submitted an im-
plementation plan for Louisiana,' 4 which was approved with
minor modifications.' 5 The Louisiana commission, in develop-
ing this plan, went beyond the federal mandate by creating
ambient air standards for a few pollutants other than those
listed by the Administrator,' 6 and also by formulating direct
emission limitations on certain kinds of operations that pol-
lute the air.'7 Although the Clean Air Act also allows each
state to regulate sources of "hazardous pollutants,' '1 8 the
Louisiana commission has chosen not to do so.
Each state enforces its implementation plan,' 9 but if it
does not, the federal Administrator may enforce it after giv-
10. Id. § 112, 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-7 (1970). A "hazardous pollutant" is defined
in the Act as one "to which no ambient air quality standard is applicable and
which in the judgment of the Administrator may cause, or contribute to, an
increase in mortality or an increase in serious irreversible, or incapacitating
reversible, illness." Id. § 112(a), 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-7(a) (1970). The Adminis-
trator has promulgated hazardous pollutant emission standards for the fol-
lowing pollutants: beryllium, mercury, and asbestos. 40 C.F.R. § 61 (1975).
11. The Act also requires a separate regulatory plan to be developed for
"new sources," with strict emission limitations applying. Clean Air Act § 111,
42 U.S.C. § 1857c-6 (1970). The Administrator's "new source" plan can be
found in 40 C.F.R. § 60 (1975).
12. Clean Air Act § 110, 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-5 (1970).
13. LA. R.S. 40:2203 (Supp. 1964).
14. B.N.A. ENVIRONMENT REPORTER 391:0501-0525.
15. 40 C.F.R. §H 52.970-52.986 (1975).
16. Louisiana Air Pollution Control Regulations §H 8-16, B.N.A. ENVI-
RONMENT REPORTER 391:0501, 0505-0509.
17. Louisiana Air Pollution Control Regulations H8 17-28, B.N.A. ENVI-
RONMENT REPORTER 391:0501, 0510-0518A.
18. Clean Air Act 112(d)(1), 42 U.S.C. 1857c-7(d)(1) (1970). See text at notes
10-11, supra.
19. Id. § 110, 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-5 (1970).
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ing thirty days notice to the state involved and to the alleged
violator.20 In addition, under § 304 of the Clean Air Act, 21 any
person may bring a civil suit to enforce, or to require the
Administrator to enforce, the standards of the Act and of any
applicable state implementation plan against an alleged vio-
lator, with only slight procedural delays. 22 Thus, a person
damaged 23 by an operation in violation of either the state
commission standards or the federal hazardous emission limi-
tations could have the violative operations abated. However,
although § 304 does allow the court, in its discretion, to award
costs of litigation, including reasonable attorney and expert
witness fees, to either party, 24 it makes no provision for dam-
ages. Therefore, it is necessary to look to state law for a cause
of action for the recovery of damages caused by pollution in
violation of the federal and state air standards.
Louisiana Civil Code articles 667-66925 provide a basis for
20. Id. § 113, 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-8 (1970). Note that under this section, if the
Administrator finds widespread evidence that the state is not enforcing its
implementation plan, he may enforce that plan without the 30-day delay.
21. 42 U.S.C. § 1857h-2 (1970).
22. A plaintiff must give notice of the violation to the Administrator, to
the State in which the violation occurs, and to the alleged violator, and wait
60 days after this notice is given before he can bring suit. Also, if the
Administrator or the state has commenced and is diligently prosecuting a
civil action to enforce the standards, a plaintiff may not bring an action
under this section. Clean Air Act § 304(b), 42 U.S.C. § 1857h-2(b) (1970). A
federal Court of Appeals has held that a private party bringing suit under this
section need not meet the traditional requirements of standing in order for
the federal courts to have jurisdiction. Metropolitan Washington Coalition
for Clean Air v. District of Columbia, 511 F.2d 809 (D.C. Cir. 1975). Section 304
also specifically gives the district courts jurisdiction in these cases "without
regard to the amount in controversy or the citizenship of the parties." For a
case applying this provision, see Citizens Ass'n of Georgetown v. Washington,
383 F. Supp. 136 (D.D.C. 1974).
23. From a look at the definitions in the Act (see text at notes 8-10,
supra), it appears that violations of the secondary ambient standards (which
did not also violate the primary standards) could result in property damages
in the area of violation. If the air quality was such that both the primary and
secondary ambient standards were violated, it seems as though there could
be both property damage and personal injuries in the area. Violations of the
hazardous pollutant emission limitations could result in personal injury
damages, and possibly also property damages because of the toxicity of these
pollutants.
24. Clean Air Act § 304(d), 42 U.S.C. § 1857h-2(d) (1970). For a decision
granting costs of litigation to an unsuccessful party in such a suit, see
Citizens Ass'n of Georgetown v. Washington, 383 F. Supp. 136 (D.D.C. 1974).
25. LA. CIV. CODE art. 667: "Although a proprietor may do with his estate
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liability in this type of case.2 6 As Professor Yiannopoulos has
noted:
Relying on the broad language of ... [article 66927] ... .
Louisiana courts have developed an impressive body of
law that corresponds with the common law of nuisance
and solutions reached by French courts without the ben-
efit of an equivalent provision in the Code civil.2
Under this Louisiana "nuisance" law, the test to determine
liability is whether the gravity of harm suffered by the plain-
tiff outweighs the social utility of the defendant's opera-
whatever he pleases, still he can not make any work on it, which may deprive
his neighbor of the liberty of enjoying his own, or which may be the cause of
any damage to him." LA. CIv. CODE art. 668: "Although one be not at liberty
to make any work by which his neighbor's buildings may be damaged, yet
every one has the liberty of doing on his own ground whatsoever he pleases,
although it should occasion some inconvenience to his neighbor. Thus he
who is not subject to any servitude originating from a particular agree-
ment in that respect, may raise his house as high as he pleases, al-
though by such elevation he should darken the lights of his neighbor's house,
because this act occasions only an inconvenience, but not a real damage"
(emphasis added). LA. CIv. CODE art. 669: "If the works or materials for any
manufactory or other operation, cause an inconvenience to those in the same
or in the neighboring houses, by diffusing smoke or nauseous smell, and
there be no servitude established by which they are regulated, their suffer-
ance must be determined by the rules of the police, or the customs of the
place."
26. The jurisprudence considers Louisiana Civil Code Articles 667-669 as
the bases of Louisiana's "nuisance" law. See Robichaux v. Huppenbauer, 258
La. 139, 149, 245 So. 2d 385, 389 (1971). Professor Yiannopoulos believes that
Article 669 alone is the basis for this "nuisance" law, and that Article 667
creates a separate ground of liability for an "abuse of right" of ownership.
Yiannopoulos, Civil Responsibility in the Framework of Vicinage, 48 TUL. L.
REV. 195 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Yiannopoulos]. Under his theory, Article
669 creates a much broader right of recovery for a plaintiff than does Article
667. He also states that damages and injunction are available remedies under
both articles, but an injunction should be available as a matter of right under
Article 667, not under Article 669. Thus the only advantage a plaintiff whose
action falls under both these articles would have in bringing the action under
Article 667 would be to get the mandatory injunction remedy. Since in the
restrictive fact situation considered in this note, the plaintiff could in effect
get an injunction under § 304 of the Clean Air Act, under Professor Yian-
nopoulos's theory he would bring an action for damages under Article 669. So
under either theory, plaintiff would bring his action under the Louisiana
"nuisance" law, the only difference in the theories being the basis on which
these jurisprudential rules were developed.
27. See discussion in note 26, supra.
28. Yiannopoulos at 236.
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tions, 29 that is, whether defendant's operations constitute an
unreasonable use under the circumstances of the particular
case.30 If the defendant's operations are found to be un-
reasonable, plaintiff need not show that the defendant was
negligent in order to recover. 31 In the Air Control Law, the
Louisiana legislature included provisions that preserved the
then-existing rights of an injured party to recover for dam-
ages caused by a nuisance. 32 It is necessary to determine if
and to what extent the federal and state air control legisla-
tion have broadened a private litigant's right to recover dam-
ages for a nuisance, or have affected the availability of proof
necessary to prosecute or defend a nuisance claim.
Although the balancing process stated above 33 is always
used to determine nuisance liability, certain activities are so
unreasonable under any circumstances that judicial inquiry
into their reasonableness in each case is unnecessary. 34 Such
activities are called nuisances per se, or absolute nuisances; 35
for example, a nuisance per se may exist when the legislature
has forbidden an activity by statute.3" When the plaintiff does
not base his action on a nuisance per se theory, but on prov-
ing a nuisance in fact, the judiciary must inquire into the
reasonableness of the defendant's activity under the circum-
stances by weighing the gravity of harm suffered by the
plaintiff against the social utility of the defendant's activity.3 7
29. See Langlois v. Allied Chemical Corp., 258 La. 1067, 1083, 249 So. 2d
133, 140 (1971); Blanc v. Murray, 36 La. Ann. 162, 167 (1884); W. PROSSER,
LAW OF TORTS § 89 at 596 (4th ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited as PROSSER];
Yiannopoulos at 220.
30. See Blanc v. Murray, 36 La. Ann. 162 (1884); Yiannopoulos, Violations
of the Obligation of Vicinage, 34 LA. L. REV. 475, 505 (1974).
31. O'Neal v. Southern Carbon Co., 211 La. 1075, 31 So. 2d 216 (1947);
Yiannopoulos at 215.
32. LA. R.S. 40:2215 (Supp. 1964): "[I]t is not intended to create in any
way new rights or to enlarge existing rights or to abrogate existing private
rights" (emphasis added). See LA. R.S. 40:2216 (1950): "Nothing herein
shall be construed to prevent private actions to abate nuisances under exist-
ing laws."
33. See text at notes 29-30, supra.
34. Even in a case in which the judiciary does not inquire into the
reasonableness of the defendant's activity, the rights of the parties have still
been balanced; however, the balancing has been done before the parties ever
become involved in litigation.
35. PROSSER § 87 at 582-83; Yiannopoulos, Violations of the Obligations of
Vicinage, 34 LA. L. REV. 475, 492 (1974).
36. Id.
37. See text at notes 29-30, supra.
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Another categorization of nuisances is made between public
and private nuisances. Generally, a public nuisance is an act
or omission that injures or substantially interferes with the
safety, health, or morals of the public in general; a private
nuisance is an offense against a private person.38 Since Loui-
siana has formulated the Air Control Law and the Commis-
sion regulations with the purpose of protecting the public
from unreasonable emission practices, 39 operations in viola-
tion of the Commission regulations could be considered both a
nuisance per se and a public nuisance.
Only the state may take action against a purely public
nuisance, 4L but some activities can be both public and private
nuisances, and in this instance a private party may recover
for the private nuisance caused him. 41 According to the juris-
prudence, a private party may recover damages caused by a
public nuisance if he can show particular damage, that is,
damage different from that suffered by the public generally.42
Personal injury or damage to property will generally be con-
sidered particular damage. 43 Arguably, a person so injured 44
by conduct that violates state commission regulations could
recover under this jurisprudential theory of particular dam-
age. However, the Louisiana Air Control Law provides:
The basis for proceedings of other actions that shall re-
sult from violations of any rule or regulation which shall
be promulgated by the commission shall inure solely to
and shall be for the benefit of the people of the state
generally and it is not intended to create in any way new
rights or to enlarge existing rights or to abrogate existing
private rights. 45
From the broad language used in this statute, the legislature
apparently intended to preclude the recovery of damages by
38. PROSSER §§ 88-89.
39. See text at note 49, infra.
40. Le Bourgeois v. New Orleans, 145 La. 274, 82 So. 268 (1919).
41. State ex rel. Dema Realty Co. v. McDonald, 168 La. 172, 121 So. 613
(1929); Barrow v. Gaillardanne, 122 La. 558, 47 So. 891 (1908).
42. E.g., Carbajal v. Vivien Ice Co., 158 La. 784, 104 So. 715 (1925); Malone,
Torts, Louisiana Legislation of 1964, 25 LA. L. REV. 47, 50 (1964).
43. PROSSER § 88 at 588. Cf. State ex rel. Dema Realty Co. v. McDonald,
168 La. 172, 121 So. 613 (1929); Barrow v. Gaillardanne, 122 La. 558, 47 So. 891
(1908).
44. See discussion in note 23, supra.
45. LA. R.S. 40:2215 (Supp. 1964).
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private persons for the mere fact of a violation of the Com-
mission regulations. Such an interpretation precludes use of
the Commission regulations to find liability based on a nui-
sance per se theory. Thus, mere proof of a violation of the
regulations plus particular damage will not suffice; the
Louisiana claimant arguably must prove nuisance in fact, i.e.,
that the defendant's activities are unreasonable under the
circumstances of the particular case.
Therefore, we look to see if the federal and state air
standards may be used in the determination of liability for a
nuisance in fact. Air pollution control is a complex and tech-
nical area,46 and the federal and state agencies concerned in
its regulation have large amounts of scientific data, and the
time, scientific experts, and other staff to help them study it.
For this reason, the Louisiana judiciary might consider
adopting the state commission regulations and the federal
hazardous emission limitations as standards of liability in
their determination of the reasonableness of a defendant's
activity. However, this should be done only if the factors used
by the agencies in formulating the federal and state air stan-
dards are the same factors used to determine the reasonable-
ness of a defendant's activities in a judicial context.
On the state level, "undesirable levels" (the term used by
the Commission to determine which pollution levels should be
prohibited) is defined as the presence in the atmosphere of a
pollutant or pollutants in quantities such as to "appreciably
injure human life beyond inconvenience or . . .to materially
injure or interfere with the reasonable use of animal or plant
life or property. ' 47 This language is similar to that found in
Civil Code Articles 667-669.48 Furthermore, the Louisiana
legislature stated that the purpose of the Air Control Law is
to maintain purity of the air resources of the state consis-
tent with the protection of the health and physical prop-
46. This is evident from a reading of the particular air quality standards
and the approved methods of measuring the quantities of these air pollut-
ants, 40 C.F.R. §§ 50, 51 (1975).
47. LA. R.S. 40:2202(C) (Supp. 1964) (emphasis added).
48. The basic principle permeating Civil Code Articles 667-669 is that one
must endure some inconveniences caused by operations on nearby estates,
but if his injury is beyond an inconvenience, so that he suffers a real damage,
he will have an action against the neighbor causing this damage. See the
language emphasized in the text of these articles quoted in note 25, supra.
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erty of the people, maximum employment and the full
industrial development of the state.4 9
Thus, the objectives of the Louisiana commission in formulat-
ing its regulations do not relate solely to environmental
concerns, but are aimed also at balancing between the com-
peting interests of necessary industry and persons who might
be injured by the industry. 50 Likewise, the federal statutory
definition of "hazardous pollutants"5' 1 indicates a concern
that damage that could be caused by such pollutants would be
of such a serious nature that the gravity of harm suffered by
an injured party would outweigh the social utility of a defen-
dant's operations. Thus, the weighing process that the state
and federal legislation mandates for the development of air
standards is very similar to the weighing test used by the
Louisiana judiciary in determining liability in a nuisance
case.
However, there are strong reasons for not using the state
commission and federal hazardous emission standards as
standards in determining liability for a nuisance in fact.
First, to use the air standards in such a manner may be
prohibited by the Louisiana Air Control Law. 52 Since a defen-
dant's conduct would be considered unreasonable without
looking into the particular circumstances of the case, one
could argue that the judiciary would in effect be declaring
operations in violation of the air standards nuisances per se.
As noted earlier, the statute seems to prevent use of commis-
sion standards as standards of absolute liability.53 Secondly,
though the weighing test used by the federal and state ad-
ministrative agencies is similar to that used by the courts in
determining liability in a nuisance case, the latter determina-
tion includes factors not considered by the administrative
49. LA. R.S. 40:2204 (Supp. 1964).
50. The fact that other interests besides purely environmental interests
are considered by the Commission can also be seen from the statutory re-
quirements of the make-up of the Commission, LA. R.S. 40:2203 (Supp. 1964).
51. For definition of "hazardous pollutant," see note 10, supra.
52. LA. R.S. 40:2215 (Supp. 1964). This provision is quoted in the text at
note 45, supra.
53. See text following note 45, supra. For the same reasons, the air
standards developed under the federal and state air pollution legislation
cannot be used as standards of conduct to determine fault under Louisiana
Civil Code Article 2315, a la Langlois v. Allied Chemical Corp., 258 La. 1067,
249 So. 2d 133 (1971).
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agencies. The judiciary additionally looks at the character of
the particular neighborhood (rural, urban, residential, in-
dustrial, etc.)4 and the prior use of each party's property
(how it was used in the past, who moved into the area first,
etc.), 55 both of which are important in the determination of
liability for a nuisance in fact.5
Even though a court might hold that the federal and
state air standards cannot be used as standards in determin-
ing liability for nuisance, the resources and information of
the administrative agencies could be utilized in the judicial
balancing process of a nuisance case involving pollution.
Under § 114 of the federal Clean Air Act,57 the Administrator
may require the owner or operator of an emission source to
maintain records, make reports, and install and use monitor-
ing equipment in order to determine if they are in violation of
any air standard; he also has the right to enter the premises
to check the emissions. In addition, the federal act gives the
Administrator the power to delegate this monitoring author-
ity to a state if the state's implementation plan is
"adequate. 5 8 Since all emission data, i.e., data on how much
of each pollutant a certain operation is actually emitting,
gathered under the authority of the act must be made pub-
lic, 59 it seems that such data could be used by either party in
a nuisance case to contribute significantly to the factual de-
termination of liability. However, the Louisiana Air Control
Law states:
54. See Irby v. Panama Ice Co., 184 La. 1082, 168 So. 306 (1936); Orton v.
Virginia Carolina Chem. Co., 142 La. 790, 77 So. 632 (1918); Kellogg v. Mer-
tens, 30 So. 2d 777 (La. App. 2d Cir. i947).
55. See Daigle v. Continental Oil Co., 277 F. Supp. 875 (W.D. La. 1967);
Kelly v. Ozone Tung Cooperative, 36 So. 2d 837 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1948).
56. Yiannopoulos, Violations of the Obligation of Vicinage, 34 LA. L. REV.
475, 506-08 (1974).
57. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1857c-9 (1970).
58. Clean Air Act § 114(b)(1), 42 U.S.C. § i857c-9(b)(1) (1970). In
Louisiana, each source of pollutants must report to the commission how
much of each pollutant they are emitting, but the commission does not
continuously monitor each source to check on these reports. Louisiana Air
Pollution Control Regulations §§ 8.5-8.6, B.N.A. ENVIRONMENT REPORTER
391:0501, 0505-0506.
59. Clean Air Act § 114(c), 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-9(c) (1970). Note that § 114(c)
creates an exception for certain information entitled to proprietary protec-
tion, but that emission data is excluded from this exception, so that in all
cases the emission data must be made public.
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A determination by the commission . . . that any rule or
regulation has been disregarded or violated . . . shall not
create by reason thereof any presumption of law or
finding of fact which shall inure to or be for the benefit of
any person other than the state.60
Although this language could be construed to prohibit the
private litigants' use of this emission data, arguably the "de-
termination" mentioned in the statute refers to a formal
commission conclusion that a violation has occurred (an ulti-
mate finding), and not to the information gathered by the
commission (the basic facts). An interpretation that it applied
to information gathered by the commission would lead to the
unfair result that if such information indicated that the oper-
ation was not in violation of any commission regulation, the
defendant could use the information as evidence in his case,
but if the data indicated that a violation had occurred, the
plaintiff could not use the information. Certainly the legisla-
ture could not have intended such a result, and there is no
apparent reason why such information should not be admit-
ted just as any other body of factual information.
The federal Clean Air Act authorizes the Administrator
to conduct, and to cause others to conduct, extensive research
on the exact effects certain pollutants have on living things
and property. 61 Because the statute does not seem to preclude
the use of the results of this research in a private suit, the
judiciary should allow a plaintiff to use these research re-
sults, along with the emission data compiled by these agen-
cies, to help prove the causal connection between his damage
and the defendant's operations.
The federal and state air pollution legislation has only
slightly broadened an injured party's rights against one
operating in violation of air quality standards developed
under this legislation. Under federal legislation, he may have
the operation abated by enforcing the air standards in a civil
suit in federal court if the appropriate state and federal of-
ficials do not enforce them.6 2 However, the broad language of
the Louisiana Air Control Law arguably should preclude him
from recovering damages simply by showing that his dam-
ages were caused by a violation of an air standard; he must
60. LA. R.S. 40:2215 (Supp. 1964).
61. Clean Air Act §§ 103-05, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1857b-1857c (1970).
62. Id. § 304, 42 U.S.C. § 1857h-2 (1970).
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show, just as in any other nuisance suit, that the defendant's
activity was unreasonable under the circumstances of the par-
ticular case: he must prove a nuisance in fact. However, the
regulatory standards should be given great weight by the
Louisiana judiciary in determining liability in a nuisance
case, because the weighing process used by the administra-
tive agencies in developing these standards is very similar to
the judiciary's nuisance test. Also, the judiciary, in their de-
termination of the issues involved in a nuisance case, should
allow private litigants to take full advantage of the emission
data and the research data on the damages caused by pollut-
ants compiled under the authority of the Clean Air Act.
Randall C. Songy
IDENTITY: A NON-STATUTORY EXCEPTION TO OTHER CRIMES
EVIDENCE
Evidence that the accused committed crimes other than
the one being prosecuted usually is inadmissible1 because of
the inherent danger that the factfinder will convict the ac-
cused of the crime charged because he has a propensity to-
ward criminal conduct. However, the general prohibition is
subject to recognized exceptions 2 based on the independent
relevancy of other crimes evidence to material questions
other than the defendant's character or propensity toward
crime. 3 Admissibility under these exceptions is predicated on
a determination that the probative value of the evidence
outweighs its inherently prejudicial effect on the accused. 4
1. C. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE §§ 184, 187 (Cleary ed. 1972) [hereinafter
cited as MCCORMICK]; J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 202, 216, 305 (3d ed. 1940)
[hereinafter cited as WIGMORE]; see also Stone, The Rule of Exclusion of
Similar Fact Evidence: America, 51 HARV. L. REV. 988 (1938) [hereinafter
cited as Stone]; Comment, Louisiana Evidence: Relevant and Material As-
pects, 21 LOYOLA L. REV. 476 (1975).
2. MCCORMICK §§ 43, 190, 288; WIGMORE §§ 218, 305, 980. See, e.g., People
v. Molineaux, 168 N.Y. 264, 61 N.E. 286 (1901) (listing the major common law
exceptions: knowledge, intent, plan, design, system, motive, emotion, and
identity). See also People v. Johnson, 228 N.Y. 332, 127 N.E. 186 (1920) (im-
peachment).
3. MCCORMICK §§ 184-85; Comment, Other Crimes Evidence in
Louisiana-To Show Knowledge, Intent, System, Etc., In the Case in Chief, 33
LA. L. REV. 614 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Other Crimes-I]; cf. FED. R.
EVID. 402, 403.
4. WIGMORE §§ 216, 416; Trautman, Logical or Legal Relevancy-A
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